| Notes |
Interpretasi dan/atau pertanyaan |
| The philosopher most often associated with the inferential view is Gilbert Ryle, who proposed in The Concept of Mind(1949) that we gain self-knowledge by applying the tools we use to understand other minds to ourselves: ‘The sorts of things that I can find out about myself are the same as the sorts of things that I can find out about other people, and the methods of finding them out are much the same.’
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Jika sama, bagaimana menjelaskan fenomena tersebut pada masyarakat nomaden? Bahwa terma other people ini, mungkin relevant jika berada pada satu lanskap sosial/kebudayaan. |
The philosopher Quassim Cassam, author of Self-knowledge for Humans (2014), describes the situation:
Philosophers who defend inferentialism – Ryle is usually mentioned in this context – are then berated for defending a patently absurd view. The assumption that intentional self-knowledge is normally immediate … is rarely defended; it’s just seen as obviously correct.
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Do more research on the topic “inferentialism” |
| For the ancient Greeks, self-knowledge was not all-encompassing, but a work in progress, and something to be striven toward, as captured by the exhortation to ‘know thyself’ carved on the Temple of Delphi. |
Noted. Clear. |
| For instance, research in my group has discovered that medial prefrontal regions not only track confidence in individual decisions, but also ‘global’ metacognitive estimates of our abilities over longer timescales – exactly the kind of self-estimates that were distorted in the patients with functional memory problems.
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Do more research on global metacognitive. Is there any universality there? |
| Most current research on metacognition focuses on the ability to think about our experiences and mental states – such as being confident in what we see or hear. But this aspect of metacognition might be distinct from how we come to know our own, or others’, character and preferences – aspects that are often the focus of research on theory of mind. New and creative experiments will be needed to cross this divide. But it seems safe to say that Descartes’s classical notion of introspection is increasingly at odds with what we know of how the brain works.
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Is this all about cultural relativity? |